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2Abstract
The thesis  of the causal closure of the physical  world renders mental and social causation
philosophically  problematic.  In  The  Construction  of  Social  Reality,  John  Searle  offers  a
partial solution to the problem of the causal efficacy of social and institutional facts by an
appeal  to the notion of the Background,  or,  as  I  will  argue,  by an appeal  to its  physical
components.  Since  Searle's  solution  refers  to  physical  facts  in  order  to  explain  social
causation, it  does not seem to differ from the solution offered by reductive physicalists to the
problem  of  mental  causation.  In  this  paper,  I  will  discuss  both  responses  to  these  two
problems  of higher-order  causation.  As  a result  of this  investigation,  the paper  offers  an
account  of how and to what extent  does Searle's  solution solve the problem of the causal
efficacy of social facts, without implying their reducibility to physical facts.
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3A Non-Reductionist Solution
 to the Problem of Social Causation
In  the  book  The  Construction  of  Social  Reality (in  short,  TCSR),  John  Searle  faces  the
problem of the causal efficacy of social and institutional facts1. He claims to answer it by an
appeal  to  the  notion  of  the  Background,  which  was  originally  introduced  in  the  book
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (in short, Intentionality). This paper aims
to  show how and  to  what  extent  does  the  notion  of  the  Background  solve  the  referred
problem. It  also  argues that,  besides  the similarities  with the reductionist  response to the
problem of mental causation, Searle's solution does not imply the reduction of social facts to
physical ones.
 
The fundamental question of contemporary philosophy
At the beginning  of  Making the Social World,  Searle  states that contemporary philosophy
faces a fundamental question that would have no historical precedence. He formulates it  as
follows:
How, if at all, can we reconcile a certain conception of the world as described
by physics, chemistry and the other basic sciences with what we know, or think
we know, about ourselves as human beings? (Searle 2010, p. 3)
This question presupposes an apparent distinction between two sorts or kinds of facts. On the
one hand, there are the facts investigated by the natural sciences,  which Searle calls  “brute
facts”. To make  the discussion  more tractable,  I  will  follow Braddon-Mitchell  and Frank
1 With the expression “causal efficacy”,  I mean the general capacity of something to play some determinate  role
in a causal nexus. I  do not identify the property of  being causally efficacious with the property of  being a
sufficient cause. 
4Jackson and indiscriminately call them “physical facts” (1996, pp. 13f.)2. On the other hand,
there are the facts that, according to common-sense and some philosophical  views,  would
compose the human impregnated part of the world (or, simply,  the human world). Among the
components of the human world, we count social and institutional facts3, as well as our mental
states4. Although this list may not be exhaustive, I will only be concerned in this paper with
the components of the human world just specified.
Components of the human world
Following a traditional characterization, mental states are understood here as states (or events)
that have intentionality or phenomenal quality as one of its properties. According to Searle,
mental states can be both phenomenal and intentional, or posses just one of these distinctive
properties (Searle 1996, p. 7).
Social and institutional facts are characterized in this paper by means of the theoretical
apparatus employed by Searle to account for their nature. Three conceptual tools have been
originally  presented: collective  intentionality,  assignment  of function and constitutive rules
(Searle 1996, p. 13). Collective intentionality is the most fundamental among them. In TCSR,
2 Someone may claim that proponents of reductive physicalism would reject this definition of physical facts as
being too  tolerant, since  it  does  not  avoid  any of  the problems emphasized  in  the  debate  concerning the
characterization of what is physical, e.g. the Hempel's dilemma. This claim is, however, harmless to the present
investigation. As suggested by Andrew Melnyk (2003, p. 11), reductive physicalists could take some facts as
physical in a broad sense, insofar as they are reducible to physical facts in the strict sense, i.e. facts which fall
under  a  more  rigid  definition  of  physical.  The tolerant  definition  proposed  here  can  be  understood  as  a
characterization of  what  reductive  physicalists would take as being non-controversially physical  in a  broad
sense.
3 Even though Searle characterizes institutional facts as a subclass of social facts (1996, p. 26), I will usually
refer to both classes as if they were independent.
4 Searle endorses the thesis that non-human animals have mental states and are able to constitute social facts. In
TCSR, he describes “the fact that those hyenas are attacking a lion” as an example of a social intentional fact
(1996, pp. 38 & 122). However, the mental states referred in “what we know or think we know about ourselves
as human beings” can be easily (though not substantively) distinguished from the mental states of other kinds of
minds. The distinction follows from the fact that we conceive our mental states to be entertained by humans.
5Searle stipulates that the expression “social facts” will refer to all facts involving collective
intentionality, and only to them (Searle 1996, pp. 26, 38 & 122). 
It  is  not  entirely  clear  what  Searle  understands  under  the  notion  of  collective
intentionality.  At one point, he characterizes it as mental states, such as beliefs,  desires, etc.
that are shared among humans or animals (Searle 1996, p. 23). At another point, collective
intentionality  is  presented as  “a  biological  primitive  phenomenon”  that  could  be  realized
inside the brain of a single person or an animal (Searle 1996, p. 25). These two claims  are
incompatible.  If a collective intentional state can be realized by a single person (or a single
brain),  then it  does not need to be shared.  In “Collective  Intentions  and Actions” (2000),
Searle explicitly  opposes the claim that collective intentional states must  be shared. In the
mentioned  paper,  he  emphasizes  the  view  “that  all  intentionality,  whether  collective  or
individual, could be had by a brain in a vat or by a set of brains in vats”  (Searle 2000, p. 96). 
There are, nonetheless,  claims  that one could uncontroversially  make about Searle's
account  of  collective  intentionality.  One  is  that,  in  his  view,  collective  intentionality  is
instantiated only by intentional states in the we-mode (Searle 1996, p. 26). Intentional states
in the we-mode do not present only to the person (or animal)  who entertains them as their
subject. Instead, a “we”, i.e., a group in which that person (or animal) presumably takes part,
is presented as the subject of such intentional states5. 
The fact  that collective  intentionality  is  instantiated by intentional states in  the we-
mode  is  prima facie compatible  with both positions  of the debate concerning  the role of
sharedness in the constitution of collective intentionality.  On the one hand, one could state
that collective intentionality occurs only when intentional states in the we-mode are shared.
On the other, one could state that a single (and, thus, not shared) instance of a mental state in
5 Another aspect that is uncontroversially recognized in Searle's account of collective intentionality is the thesis
of the irreducibility of intentional states in the we-mode to intentional states in the I-mode. 
6the we-mode  would  be  sufficient.  However,  an analysis  shows that  the latter  position is
unacceptable.
Searle  defends that intentional states represent,  by means of their  content and their
direction of fit,  their  own conditions of satisfaction (Cf.  Searle  1983, p. 13; 2010, p. 29).
Thus,  he  says,  “a  belief  represents  its  truth conditions,  a  desire  represents  its  fulfillment
conditions,  an intention represents its carrying  out conditions” (Searle  2010, p. 29). But do
intentional states in the we-mode have some specific condition of satisfaction that intentional
states in the I-mode lack? Consider the intentional state expressed in “we believe that we are
walking together”. Nothing prevents that this intentional state might  be instantiated at some
place  and  time  by  an  individual  with  whom no  one  is  intentionally  walking.  There  are
different possible scenarios in which that person might  instantiate such state. She may think
she is accompanied by someone, when, in fact, she is walking alone. She may be side by side
with an acquaintance that, for any reason (Alzheimer or the works of a  Malin génie), might
forget that he is  with her, etc. It does not matter how this single instantiation might  occur,
what matters is that the respective intentional state is false in all possible scenarios. One of the
conditions represented by the intentional state is not satisfied in any of theses cases. The truth
condition  involved  in  this  particular  intentional  state  would  have  been  satisfied  if  the
intentional state expressed in “we believe that we are walking together” were shared by the
other  person(s)  to  which  the  term  “we”  also  refers.  Given  that  an  instantiation  of  an
intentional  state  in  the we-mode always  attributes the same  state to others,  then any true
intentional state in the we-mode must be shared among the individuals that are referred to as
their subjects. The conclusion that intentional states in the we-mode are falsified, if they are
not shared, is a strong reason to restrict the notion of collective intentionality to the cases in
which such intentional states are shared among the individuals referred as their subjects. I will
7employ the expression “collective intentional state” to refer to intentional states in the we-
mode that are shared in this way.
It  is  important  to  highlight  that  social  facts  are  not  just  correlated  to  collective
intentionality,  but are also constituted by it.  The collective  intentionality  condition for  the
constitution  of  social  facts  determines  two  of  their  distinctive  features.  They  are
intentionality-relative,  i.e.,  they do not  exist  independently  of instantiations  of intentional
states, and they are objective, in the sense that the collective intentional state that constitutes
them must be shared among individuals.
 The conceptual tools that let us comprehend the specific nature of social objects and
institutional facts, namely,  the notions of assignment of functions and constitutive rules, also
represent conditions for their constitution. 
The notion of an assignment of function is entitled to explain how certain things in the
world  acquire  functions.  Typical  examples  of functional  facts  are artifacts  and  biological
structures. Differently from mere constituents of causal mechanisms, a functional fact would
be determined by “purposes, goals and values” (Searle, 1996, p. 19). It is also characterized
by a specific  normative  feature, namely,  that a functional  fact  possess a function not only
when it works, but also when it is not employed, and even when it fails to perform the causal
role  indicated  by  its  function  (ibidem).  According  to  Searle,  functions  are  always
intentionality-relative  (Searle  1996,  p  14).  This  implies  that  functional  facts  are  not
constituted by  their  physical  components,  but  depend  on intentional  states to  exist.  Such
intentional states have the form of an assignment or an imposition of function. The functional
object constituted will be a social fact (or a social object, as I will call it for now on), if the
assignment of function is performed by a collective intentional state6.
6 Searle explicitly distinguishes between “singular and collective impositions of functions ” (1996, p. 122).
8According to the theory presented in  TCSR, institutional facts are constituted by the
establishment,  i.e., the collective recognition, acceptance or acknowledgment of constitutive
rules  (Searle  1996 p.  40).  Constitutive  rules  have  the  form “X counts as  Y in  C”  ,  and
constitute  institutional  facts  by  assigning  status-functions  (Y)  to  physical  facts  or  to
previously constituted institutional facts (X) (Searle 1996, pp. 40 & 80).
The components of the physical world; the causal closure and the reductionist solution
to the problem of mental causation
Without expecting to offer an exhaustive list, I want to emphasize two distinguishing features
of physical facts. According to the definition mentioned earlier,  physical facts are the ones
investigated by the natural sciences. However, attention to the actual natural sciences shows
that this definition is  problematic.  A widely acknowledged aim of biology is  to reveal the
functions  of  biological  structures.  If  being  the  subject  of  a  natural  science  is  the  only
condition for something to be a physical fact, then the functional facts investigated in some
sub-disciplines of biology would be physical. But a functional fact is, in Searle's view, always
intentionality-relative. Its existence is dependent on an intentional state that assigns a function
to it.  In  a  plausible  interpretation of the fundamental  question mentioned  above,  if  a  fact
depends in this way on our intentionality,  then it is a component of the human impregnated
part  of  the  world.  In  order  to  avoid  the  danger  of  classifying  things  both  among  the
components of the physical world and the components of the human world, we can exclude
any intentionality-relative fact from the set of physical facts. Searle does this by stipulating
that physical facts, or, in his words, the features described in “our fundamental ontology”, are
intrinsic features of the world (Searle 1996, p. 9)7. By doing so, he excludes all functional
7 Searle argues that the intrinsic features of the world are not restricted to the physical facts, but  include all
mental states as well (Searle 1996, p. 11). He contrasts these features with the intentionality-relative features of
9facts from the set of physical facts. This does not mean that biological structures – and the
causal mechanisms in which they take part – are not included among what is understood here
as physical.  I  will  soon refer  to neural processes and structures as physical  facts,  and the
possibility of such characterization is important for the purposes of this paper. Nonetheless,
the  functions  that  are  imposed  or  asssigned  to  these  biological  structures  –  with  all  the
features that determine them, such as “purposes, goals and values” and the normative aspect
explained above – are excluded from the physical world.
 Based on scientific  findings,  it  is  claimed  that  physical  facts have  at  least  another
shared  and  distinctive  feature (Papineau  2009,  pp.  57 & 60).  They are components  of a
domain,  “the  physical  world”,  that  is  causally  closed.  As  it  is  common  in  the  current
literature, I will use the expression ‘physical world’ to distinguish the set of physical facts.
The thesis of the causal closure of the physical world says that: 
Every physical effect has an immediate sufficient physical cause, in so far as
it has a sufficient physical cause at all (Papineau 2009, p. 59; Cf. also Kim
2005, p. 15). 
Given the causal closure of the physical world, two similar problems emerge. It is clear that
these problems stand against the reconciliation of the two conceptions of the world referred in
the fundamental question presented above. One is the problem of the causal efficacy of social
and  institutional  facts.  This  problem  can  be  formulated  as  follows:  How can  social  and
institutional  facts have causal efficacy in  a causally  closed physical  world? The other, but
very similar  problem concerns mental causation and it  is  formulated as:  How can mental
states have causal efficacy in a causally closed physical world?
The problem of mental causation is  one of the most discussed themes in the current
philosophy of mind. Based on the thesis of the causal closure of the physical world, Jaegwon
the  world.  This  distinction  does  not  coincide  with  the  one  presented  by  the  fundamental  question  under
discussion, since mental states are evidently among the human components of the world.
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Kim  and  others  have  formulated  the  most  compelling  argument  in  favor  of  reductive
physicalism,  the so-called causal argument. The thesis of the causal closure of the physical
world implies that any physical fact or (supervenient) mental state that is allegedly caused by
a prior mental state would have two independent  sufficient  causes (Papineau 2009, p. 61).
There would be a sufficient physical cause, as the thesis of the causal closure of the physical
world profess, and the alleged mental cause. But the second premise of the causal argument,
namely,  the  metaphysical  principle  of  causal  exclusion,  makes  the  claim  of  the  two
independent sufficient causes unacceptable. Kim characterizes this principle as follows:
If an event e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event at t distinct from c can be a
cause of  e (unless it  is  a  genuine case of  causal overdetermination) (Kim
2005, p. 17).
By taking as premises  both the thesis  of the causal closure of the physical  world and the
metaphysical principle just mentioned, proponents of reductive physicalism argue that mental
states must be reducible to physical facts, in order to be able to cause other physical facts and
other mental states8.
Searle’s partial solution to the problem of social causation.
A survey  of Searle’s  writings  reveals  that  he  has  referred  to  a  Background for  different
reasons (Cf. Searle 1983, pp. 145-152; Searle 1996, pp. 132-137 & Searle 2010, 155-160)9. In
TCSR, however, the most important reason for appealing to a notion of the Background is to
8 In Mind: A Brief Introduction, Searle explicitly acknowledges the causal closure of the physical world (p. 136),
and sketches a non-reductionist response to the problem of mental causation (pp. 146f). This response may be
useful to understand how the Background explains the causality of social and institutional facts, but I do not
think it will help us to understand their irreducibility. Searle's argument for the irreducibility of mental states is
based on the fact that they have a “first-person ontology”, while physical facts have a “third-person ontology”
(Searle 2004, p. 147). 
9 M. Ratcliffe claims that Searle “regards the Background as a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for
almost all human experience, agency and language”(2004, p. 151).
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answer the question of how institutional and, I want to claim, also other kinds of social facts,
have causal efficacy.
At the beginning of the book, Searle states: 
…  to  explain  the  causal  functioning  of  institutional  structures,  we  will
introduce  (…) the Background  of  capacities that  humans have for coping
with their environment.  (Searle 1996, p. 13). 
Before  investigating  the  nature  of  the  Background,  it  is  important  to  consider  a
restriction indicated by Searle himself  to the thesis that the Background would explain the
causal  efficacy  of  social  and  institutional  facts.  According  to  Searle,  the  notion  of  the
Background is entitled to explain:
how we can relate to rule structures such as language, money, marriage, and
so on, in cases where we do not know the rules and are not following them
either consciously or unconsciously (Searle 1996, p. 129)10.
In the passage just quoted, two ways of relating to institutional facts are acknowledged.  
1. In some cases, we relate to institutional facts by following constitutive rules. For example,
when someone learns the rules of chess.
2.  In the majority  of cases  in  which  we relate  to  institutional  facts,  however,  we  do not
actually  follow a constitutive rules – neither consciously,  nor unconsciously.  We just act in
conformity with them. For example, when a professional chess player plays chess.
I claim that there are analogous ways of relating with social objects (or artifacts):
1’. In some cases, we relate to social objects by assigning them functions in a theoretical way.
In these cases, we entertain the thought that the social object in question has a certain function
that characterizes it. For example, when someone learns how to use the most unusual tools of
her Swiss army knife.
10 The emphasis is mine.
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2’. In the majority of cases in which we relate to social objects, however, we do not entertain
any  thoughts  about  their  characteristic  function.  We assign  them a function  in  a  strictly
practical way. For example, when I put my glasses after waking up.
Based on these distinctions,  a formulation of the claim involved in Searle’s solution to the
problem of the causal efficacy of social facts would be as follows:
Searle’s solution: The notion of the Background explains the causal efficacy
of social objects and institutional facts in  the cases when we relate to (2.)
institutional facts just  by acting in  conformity with their constitutive rules;
and when we relate to (2’.) social objects by assigning  them functions in  a
strictly practical way.  
The physical Background
Searle appealed to a so-called hypothesis of the Background for different reasons, and – so it
seems – has conceived different things under this title. I will attempt to present a notion of the
Background that is compatible with the claims he made in Intentionality and TCSR.
In  Intentionality,  when  explaining  how  the  Background  works,  he  says:  “…  the
repeated  experiences  create  physical  capacities,  presumably  realized  as  neural  pathways”
(Searle 1983, p. 150); and that “practice enables the body to take over and the rules recede
into the Background” (ibidem). These passages seem to imply  that the components of the
Background are physical. But subsequently, Searle makes a very cautious claim. He says that
the things  composing  the Background (i.e.,  skills,  stances,  preintentional  assumptions  and
presuppositions,  practices,  and  habits)  “are  realized  in  human  brains  and  bodies”  (Searle
1996,  p.  154).  The  claim  that  they  are  realized  in  human  brains  and  bodies  suggests  a
characterization of the nature of the Background that differs from the one based on the other
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quoted passages. The components of the Background should, according to this last claim, not
be conceived as identical with physical facts, but as being realized by them.
In TCSR, however, Searle states that: 
It is important to see that when we talk about the Background we are talking
about a certain category of neurophysiological causation. Because we do not
know how these  structures  function at  a  neurophysiological  level,  we  are
forced to describe them in a much higher level. (Searle 1996, p. 129).
In this passage, Searle clearly elucidates that (at least in  TCSR) when he uses terms such as
“preintentional  capacities”  to  describe  the  components  of the  Background,  he  is  actually
talking about neural processes and structure, but in a different level of description. Based on
this passage, I propose an interpretation, according to which the Background is a set of neural
states or events, that means, a set of physical facts. I will call it the physical Background.
A passage already quoted reveals an important aspect of the physical Background. It
says that “... practice enables the body to take over and the rules recede into the Background”
(Searle 1983, p. 150). The structure in which the physical components of the Background are
related to each other is determined by practice or, in other words, by learning processes. The
causal roles that the physical components of the Background are expected to perform in the
cases  described  in  (2.)  and  (2`.)  are,  in  fact,  programed  responses  to  social  objects  and
institutional facts.
How does Searle's Solution work, and to what extent?
It is time to consider how the notion of a programmed physical Background might solve the
problem of the causal efficacy of social facts. We must remember, however, that the notion of
a programmed physical Background is not entitled to explain all kinds of cases in which we
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may relate to a social object or an institutional fact. Only the cases described in (2.) and (2'.),
i.e., the cases in which we relate to social objects and institutional facts in a practical way, are
expected to be explained  by an appeal to the notion of the Background.  I  claim that two
aspects of interactions of this kind (or three, in  the case of social and institutional objects)
justify taking social objects and institutional facts to be causally efficacious. These aspects are
the following:
i.  The physical components of the Background participate in the causal nexus in  question.
They participate as components of the sufficient physical cause of the caused event. 
ii.  In  cases  of interaction with social  and  institutional  objects  (e.g.,  a  5  Euros note),  the
physical  components of these object will  also take part in the causal nexus.  Together with
some  physical  components  of  the  Background,  they  participate  as  components  of  the
sufficient physical cause of the caused event.
iii.  The  components of the physical  Background perform a role  in  the causal  nexus  only
because the Background was programmed to respond in that way to the social or institutional
facts to which the subject is related.
If these aspects are actualized, the social or institutional fact  to which we are related in  a
practical way can be rightfully characterized as causally efficacious.
The accusation that Searle’s account implies the reducibility of social to physical facts
Proponents of reductive physicalism have described the explanation of a token (or instance)
of some higher-level type through the mention of a simultaneous token (or instance) of some
lower-level type as a reduction or, more precisely,  as a reductive explanation (Cf.  Melnyk
2003, p.  82; Kim 2008, pp. 94 & 96). Examples of reductive explanations are the identity
statements between instances of mental states and physical facts that, according to reductive
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physicalism,  must be true if the instances of the mental states are causes of any event. The
definition of a reductive explanation compels us to recognize in Searle's solution a large a set
of reductive  explanations.  Given  that  it  refers  to components  of the Background  (i.e.,  to
certain  physical  facts) in  order to explain  the causal efficacy of social  facts,  it  seems that
Searle's solution consists in reductive explanations of the practical relations we maintain to
these facts.
In the last part of this paper, I will investigate whether, according to Searle's account,
social objects and institutional facts are reducible to physical components of the Background,
or to these in conjunction with their own physical components.
The  constitution  of  social  and  institutional  facts,  and  their  irreducibility  to  the
components of the Background that make them causally efficacious
As argued above, social and institutional facts are constituted if some determinate conditions
are satisfied. The specific  features that take part in the constitution of social and institutional
facts  determine  their  distinctive  features.  I  will  argue  that,  because  of  some  of  these
distinctive  features,  social  objects  and  institutional  facts  cannot  be  reduced  to  physical
components  of  the  Background,  or  to  these  in  conjunction  with  their  own  physical
components.
According to Searle's account, the most general condition for the constitution of social
facts is that they must be correlated to collective intentionality. The condition that places the
role of collective  intentionality  reveals  that social facts are intentionality  relative.  But  the
constitution through a collective intentional state imposes yet another feature on social facts.
They are objective in  the sense that their  existence as social  facts does not follow from a
singular instance of an intentional state in the we-mode, such as my belief that we are walking
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together, in a case when no one is intentionally accompanying me. If a fact is truly social, the
intentional state in the we-mode that constitutes it must be shared among the individuals that
are referred as subjects of the intentional state.
Social objects have yet another constitutive condition, namely, the role of assignment
of functions. In conjunction with the collective intentionality condition, a social object must
have a function assigned to it by instantiations of an intentional state in the we-mode among
the individuals  referred as the subjects of the intentional  state. In contrast to more simple
social  facts,  an intentional  state in  the we-mode that assigns  a function to a  social  object
usually refers to an indeterminate set of subjects. Consider, for example, the intentional state
expressed  by  the  sentence  “we  believe  that  scissors  have  the  function  of  cutting”.  The
continued existence  (or maintenance) of a social  object  is  guaranteed as long as there are
individuals instantiating the intentional state in the we-mode that assigns a function to it. This
feature is compatible with the possibility that a social object might have a continued existence
in spite of changes, in the course of time, in the set of individuals that collectively assign a
function to it.
Institutional  facts  are  also  intentionality-relative  and  objective  in  the  sense  just
elucidated. As in the case of social objects,  the constitution of institutional facts is  distinct
from that  of more  simple  social  facts  by  demanding  a  specific  condition.  According  to
Searle's position in  TCSR, an institutional fact must have a status-function assigned to it  by
constitutive rules. Considered in conjunction with the collective intentionality condition, the
assignment  of a  status-function that  constitutes an institutional  fact  must  be  realized  by a
group of individuals.  According  to  Searle,  this  occurs through a collective  acceptance  or
recognition of a constitutive rule of the form “X counts as Y in context C” (Searle 1996, p.
28). Similar to the case of social objects, institutional facts have a continued existence as long
as there is a collective recognition of their constitutive rules among a (usually indeterminate)
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set  of individuals.  This  feature is  compatible  with the possibility  that  an institutional  fact
might  maintain their status-function in spite of changes, in the course of time, in the set of
individuals that recognize its constitutive rule.
 The irreducibility  of social objects and institutional facts to the components of the
Background that make them causally efficacious – or to these in conjunction with their own
physical components – is based on the fact that the latter are not sufficient  to constitute the
first.  The  components  of the  Background  can,  at  most,  constitute single  instantiations  of
collective  intentional  states  in  one  individual.  Thus,  it  enables  practical  assignments  of
functions to social objects or actions in conformity with the constitutive rules of institutional
facts. But this is  not enough for constituting social objects or institutional facts. As I have
argued, in the cases of social objects and institutional facts, a (usually indeterminate) set of
individuals, that may even change in the course of time, must instantiate intentional states in
the we-mode in order guarantee their constitution.
Conclusion
To conclude, I would like to summarize the main theses that I have argued for in this paper.
Firstly,  I have defended the claim that the notion of a physical Background solves (at least
partially)  the problem of the causal efficacy of social facts in the cases in which we relate to
them  in  a  practical  way.  Secondly,  I  have  shown  that  the  physical  components  of  the
Background that secure the causal efficacy of a social object or an institutional fact are not
sufficient  for  their  constitution.  Thus,  an  account  was  given  about  how the  notion  of  a
programmed physical Background solves, at least partially, the problem of the causal efficacy
of social and institutional facts, without implying their reducibility to the physical facts.
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